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Abstract—A substantial administrative burden is placed on
healthcare professionals as they manage and progress through
their careers. Identity verification, pre-employment screening
and appraisals: the bureaucracy associated with each of these
processes takes precious time out of a healthcare professional’s
day. Time that could have been spent focused on patient care.
In the midst of the COVID-19 crisis, it is more important
than ever to optimize these professionals’ time. This paper
presents the synthesis of a design workshop held at the Royal
College of Physicians of Edinburgh (RCPE) and subsequent
interviews with healthcare professionals. The main research
question posed is whether these processes can be re-imagined
using digital technologies, specifically Self-Sovereign Identity? A
key contribution in the paper is the development of a set of
user-led requirements and design principles for identity systems
used within healthcare. These are then contrasted with design
principles found in the literature. The results of this study confirm
the need and potential of professionalising identity and credential
management throughout a healthcare professional’s career.
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I. INTRODUCTION
While the COVID-19 crisis has brought the challenges of
staff mobility into the spotlight, the administrative burden
placed on a healthcare professional throughout their career
has always been present. Over the years healthcare service
providers have increased the minimum standard for identity
verification and pre-employment checks in line with new
regulations [1], [2]. As a result, the time spent on these pro-
cesses has increased. A House of Lord’s report, for example,
estimated that 25,000 junior doctor days a year were currently
being spent on these administrative tasks [3]. In addition to
this, digitisation of healthcare services has further increased
the time and complexity associated with managing one’s
career. In a 2011 US survey, 87% of physicians stated that the
leading cause of stress was down to administration [4] and a
study of Finnish physicians found that poorly functioning IT
systems continue to be a major cause of stress, particularly
for those in highly time pressured roles [5]. Another major
challenge is within doctors working across both in public
health care and also in private practice [6].
In a crisis like the COVID-19 outbreak, the need for
a healthcare service to react to rapidly evolving, location
specific, stresses at a Trust or Hospital level cannot be clearer.
Different locations may hit their peak at different times, while
some areas may only be minimally affected [7]. However,
consultation with an RCPE trainee suggests that on-boarding
into a new Trust or hospital can take up to two days. This
is two days of precious time that could potentially have been
spent saving lives. Technological solutions have regularly been
heralded for their ability to reduce inefficiencies and streamline
patient care. Blockchain technology is just one of the more
recent innovations predicted to have a disruptive impact [8].
Often though, the reality in the hospitals is different to the
design assumptions made by technologists and the productivity
benefits are not always obvious [9].
This paper thus presents an initial set of design principles
for any technical solution attempting to reduce the adminis-
trative burdens currently placed on healthcare professionals.
An analysis of discourse about digital identities, verifiable
claims and trust has led to a theoretical set of trust and design
principles. These principles were validated in a workshop with
healthcare organisations held at the RCPE. This research takes
an initial step towards understanding the problem space from
the perspective of those currently experiencing it and lays the
foundation for future quantitative studies in this area.
A. Research questions
This paper evaluates a use case in which a person can digi-
tally obtain, manage and present their professionals credentials
and personally identifiable data within an healthcare system.
We limited the scope of the work to healthcare professionals,
as these are identified as being burdened with administrative
tasks associated with identity verification, and pre-employment
checks. As well as recording and managing their credentials as
they progress through their career. A burden which is generally
expected to take place in people’s personal lives. The following
research questions were identified:
• What are the identity interactions that a healthcare pro-
fessional must manage throughout their career?
• How might Self-Sovereign Identity technology be used
to simplify a healthcare professionals identity adminis-
tration?
• How do the design principles of Self-Sovereign identity
stated in the literature and technical sphere meet the
requirements of the healthcare professionals that would
actually be using these systems?
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II. RELATED LITERATURE
Berwick, Nolan and Whittington define the Triple Aim fo-
cusing on improving the care, health and cost when accessing
healthcare performance in the US [10]. They point out that
these goals are interdependent so must be considered together
when planning and evaluating healthcare changes. It has been
suggested that this framework should be extended to consider
a fourth aim, care for the provider [11], due to reports that staff
burnout and dissatisfaction is widespread. As care providers
are on the frontline when it comes to achieving the triple aim
for healthcare services, including their well being into this
assessment makes sense.
A. Healthcare Professional Credentials
Healthcare providers have a requirement to maintain strong
identity verification checks to ensure that their employees are
who they claim to be and that they have the required skills
and training for the job [2], [12], [13]. Unfortunately, there
have been examples throughout the world of doctors practising
without licences. This puts patients lives at risk and reduces
the trust in the profession as a whole. Examples include;
the UK General Medical Council recently having to recheck
credentials of 3,000 doctors after a fraudulent psychiatrist was
found to have practiced for 23 years without proper credentials
[14], the case of a social worker in Canada involved in more
that 100 child protection cases [15] and the notorious US case
of Christopher Duntsch a.k.a Dr Death [16].
As a consequence, credentialing healthcare professionals
is a crucial process in healthcare systems throughout the
world. However, the current practices of many systems add
huge overheads to both the administrators and the healthcare
professionals. In a report on healthcare and digital credentials
the US Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB) [12]
analyse the use of digital credentials in healthcare, looking at
the potential for both current technology and future technology
to streamline the process and enhance trust in the system.
The implementation of the Federation Credentials Verification
Service (FCVS) in 1996 [17], a NCQA-certified platform
providing a centralized service for obtaining primary source,
verified education information for medical practitioners apply-
ing for licensing in the US. As the report [12] outlines, the
FCVS reduced the time to obtain a license from 60 days to 25
days. A significant reduction. However, efforts to improve the
FCVS highlighted the underutilization of technology in the
process. Furthermore 66% of this time is driven by parties
outside of the control of the FCVS [12]. These credential
verification organisations are often redundant and increase the
cost of the whole process. The report highlights the movement
to disintermediate the creation and management of creden-
tials, hinting at a movement towards individual ownership of
credentials.
Along with this there is an increasing need for clinical
staff to provide digital evidence of their training, skills and
experience. Read et al [18] investigated the usage of a pass-
porting system for surgery clerkship and found that those
involved often found that it improved student’s reporting of
their performance in basic clinical skills.
B. Self-sovereign identity (SSI)
Digital identifiers - and the trust entities place in them -
enable many modern societal interactions. They thus allow
organisations to perform critical activities with increased levels
of trust. Another way of looking at it is from a risk perspective,
and where digital identifiers and account information corre-
lated with an identifier that helps organisations make risk-
based decisions associated with a particular interaction and
value exchange. Unfortunately, traditional identity manage-
ment systems continue to have security risks [19], such as:
credential theft or loss; biometric impersonation; document
forgery; and identity theft.
SSI uses a new type of identifier currently going through
standardisation at the W3C, a Decentralised Identifier (DID)
[20]. A DID is an identifier under the sole domain an entity,
typically the entity that created it. They are cryptographically
verifiable and independent of any central authority. Rather
than being assigned an identifier on account creation, DIDs
let individuals provide their own identifiers for their digital
relationships.For a more detailed description of the technical
architecture pf self-sovereign identity we point the reader to
the following survey [21].
Systems built following an SSI architecture could offer the
opportunity to rethink the entire credential process for physi-
cians. Before the electronic transmission of credentials can be
put forward as a viable option for healthcare professionals,
it must be considered if such a process would break any of
the rules and regulations currently governing this area. The
key things identity verification and authentication process must
satisfy for most healthcare services are [12], [2]:
• Is it possible to verify the authenticity of the claim?
• Is the claim a primary source attestation. For example, is
your degree certification a certificate from the university
you attended?
• Was the credential securely delivered from the credential
holder to the verifier?
• Is there a clear, verifiable audit trail that can trace the
origin of this credential?
These points can, in fact, all be satisfied digitally through
the use of digital signatures.
The problem of scaling digital identities into health care
systems have lead many people to explore alternative methods
to identify and authenticate people and things in the digi-
tal sphere. One of the proposed architectures is commonly
referred to as Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI). Connor-Green
identifies that SSIs could be one of the core use cases of
blockchain in health [22]. Liang et al outline a blockchain
approach within a heath care management system and where
the distributed nature of SSIs support a scalable infrastructure
which moves away from the centralised control of identity
within many existing health care infrastructures [23], [24].
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Fig. 1. Patient centric personal health data management system [23]
III. METHOD
The goal of the workshop was to gather a set of values
and principles that can be used to evaluate emerging technol-
ogy for identity systems within healthcare. Terminology and
definitions are often much contested in different contexts. We
used definitions provided in the selected papers as much as
possible, but some definitions were adapted to better fit our
goal to measure the value or principle.
The next step in our research was a workshop organised
at RCPE. It involved 14 participants with a wide ranging
experience of different aspects of the healthcare system. The
participants for the workshop were selected through con-
sultation with the RCPE, and who were able to use their
contacts to invite a diverse range of attendees. This included
clinicians, RCPE trainees, and RCPE staff involved in data
management, digital transformation and education, as well as
a representative from the General Medical Council (GMC).
While no personal data was captured during the workshop and
all attendees remain anonymous, explicit consent was obtained
and the research aims were explained at the beginning of the
workshop.
During the workshop, the participants evaluated the fit of
SSI within the healthcare domain. First, a process mapping
exercise was used to develop an understanding of the current
system, looking at the identity data exchanges and key en-
tities that verify or attest to identity attributes of healthcare
professionals throughout their career.
Then these identity moments were re-imagined within a
SSI enabled ecosystem, this story was told in an interactive
manner using physical props and audience participation in
order to convey the capabilities that SSI systems could provide
for healthcare professionals, without going into unnecessary
technical detail. Finally, the workshop participants were asked
to evaluate the positive and negative aspects of the identity
management system. The participants expressed their require-
ments, values and expectations. The list that was distilled from
these workshop discussions was compared against the list of
design principles from the desk research.
IV. DESIGN PRINCIPLES FOR SELF-SOVEREIGN IDENTITY
SYSTEMS
The success of any SSI system depends not only on the
technical feasibility but also on the user acceptance and trust
in the system. With users we mean all stakeholders (entities)
within a specific context that will use that system together.
Trust is harder to define, as there exist more than 70 definitions
in academic literature [25]. Trust is seen as a human strategy
to cope with uncertainty, such as those we face in relations,
actions and innovation [26]. In a digital context, trust is often
transferred to cybersecurity measures such as technological
controls, certificates, and organisational compliance frame-
works. In SSI systems, at least some aspects of this trust shifts
from trust between people towards confidence that is placed in
cryptographic systems. As Smolenski [27] frames it: trust is
being depersonalized. Designing new digital identity systems
means mimicking real-life situations in a digital way. Human
values, such as ethics and trust need a digital equivalent that
users need to accept and understand. How do we design trust
from the start? Which design principles are most valued by
users and most likely to establish trust in these systems?
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There are many papers that refer to the Laws of Identity
(coined by Cameron in 2005) [28] as the foundation for
design principles. These laws explain the dynamics causing
digital identity systems to succeed or fail in various contexts.
Although written before the era of SSI, Cameron himself
finds the laws still relevant, also for identity systems on the
blockchain and decentralized identity [29]. He points out, for
instance, that the first four of the laws are also requirements
within the GDPR.
In 2016, Christopher Allen [30] wrote 10 principles inspired
by (amongst others) the work of Cameron. His aim was to
ensure that user control is at the heart of SSI. Allen pointed out
that identity can be a double-edged sword: it can be used for
both beneficial and maleficent purposes. Therefore, he states:
an identity system must balance transparency, fairness, and
support of the commons with protection for the individual.
The Sovrin Foundation [31] adopted Allen’s principles and
arranged them in three sections, but this causes some con-
fusion as they used one principle twice and made another
principle a section above other principles. Other researchers
and developers have used Cameron’s or Allen’s principles for
inspiration and adapted them to their own lists of features.
However, testing of SSI systems against these features and
design principles is still rare.
Dunphy & Petitcolas [32] evaluated three identity man-
agement solutions (uPort, Sovrin, and ShoCard) against
Cameron’s laws of identity. Their overview shows that none of
the solutions meets all seven laws, and non of them meets the
law of human integration: usability, user understanding and
user experience. They state that none of the schemes they
evaluated are accompanied by an evidence-based vision of
user interaction. One of the limitations is usable end user key
management for nontechnical users that remains unaddressed.
Furthermore, they express concern about tightening regulation,
such as the GDPR, that sometimes contradicts the transparency
of data storage in these solutions. Finally, most solutions
provide only ad-hoc trust, as trust relies on integration between
participating entities and methods to achieve trust in the
context of identity attributes are still evolving.
Ferdous et al. [33] elaborated on the principles of Allen and
designed a taxonomy of essential properties for SSI. Then,
they compared four blockchain-based SSI systems (uPort,
Jolo, Sovrin, Blockcerts) against the properties and through
desk research they found that most of the systems satisfy
most of the properties. Similar work was done in a student
project [34] where students compared eight blockchain-based
(IDchainz, Uport, EverID, Sovrin, LifeID, Selfkey, Shocard,
Sora) and three non-blockchain based SSI systems (PDS,
IRMA, reclaimID) against each of Allen’s principles with one
additional principle [35]. They concluded that some of the
blockchain based solutions fulfil all properties, but that some
of the non-blockchain-based implementations meet most of the
criteria as well. Interestingly, their conclusions as to whether
the properties are met do not always match the conclusions
of [33] for two systems (Uport and Sovrin) that both projects
evaluated. Toth and Anderson-Priddy [36] validated nine prop-
erties from earlier sources (e.g. Allen and Sovrin Foundation)
and added new properties. They applied these properties to
their architecture for digital identity and reasoned how these
apply to their solution (NexGenID).
To the best of our knowledge, published evaluation of values
and principles with users in a specific SSI context is very
rare. One project that focused on citizens and digital identity
systems in general (not SSI specific) was the Digital Identity
lab in The Netherlands. In several interactive sessions with
citizens they found which values matter the most for digital
identities [37]. The research methods included interviews in
the streets, meet-ups, expert sessions and design sprints. The
results include evaluation quadrants to plot digital identity
providers and an overview of values that citizens find im-
portant, and that can be used as input for ethical design and
trust of digital identity systems. Another project focusing on
user experience is the IRMA Made Easy project [38]. IRMA
(I Reveal My Attributes) is a self-sovereign identity solution
with a digital wallet. The IRMA Made Easy Project works on
the design of the app and website with a focus on accessibility.
The developers of IRMA point out that user experience design
affects how users handle the control over their information.
From their experience they share three lessons:
1) In order for new technology to be adopted, they require
a smooth user experience.
2) User experience design for privacy is not the same as
general user experience design.
3) A system that puts people in control over their data does
not always lead to people using that control to protect
their privacy: it can even lead to the opposite when they
are tricked by others.
From the literature study we learned that there is a gap in
academic research that includes evaluation of proposed SSI
solutions from a user perspective with domain knowledge of
the ecosystem. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, the
most commonly used design principles have not been validated
by users for importance and priority. Projects that included
consumers focus on identity management in general, and stud-
ies on SSI systems tend to focus on the evaluation by technical
experts through desk research. Furthermore, when SSI design
principles and features indeed are evaluated, the researchers
re-use existing frameworks or lists of principles without user
elicitation for principles that technology experts have not
imagined yet. If we do not understand the requirements of end
users then we run the risk of creating digital tools that no one
wants to use, or worse introducing unintended consequences
through the deployment of these systems to domains with
poorly understood requirements. There are countless examples
of technology being introduced into healthcare only to make
the jobs of those working alongside this technology worse, like
the 15 logins needed to access different NHS systems [39].
We compared the different lists of principles, features and
values that we found, and created an overview of different and
overlapping principles. The results are presented in table I.
The overview of principles was input for the next stage in our
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research, where we invited future users to express their opinion
on principles and values. In the next section we describe the
workshop that we held with representatives of different entities
in an ecosystem, in order to contribute to the knowledge of
end-user perception and trust of SSI systems.
V. WORKSHOP DESCRIPTION
After a brief introduction, participants were asked to com-
plete a warm up exercise where they recorded different identity
interactions that occur throughout a typical day in their life.
This included using a RFID card, logging into a digital system
with a username and password, authenticating to a mobile
device, bank card payments. Anything that involved some form
of identification and authentication. Participants were also
asked to record times when authentication failed for example
through a rushed or forgotten password attempt.
The aim of the exercises was to get attendees thinking
about how often they interact with digital systems, how many
different username and passwords they currently manage and
the number of different authentication devices that they have
to carry. The majority of participants recorded over 25 separate
identity interactions, all in a single day.
A. Healthcare Ecosystem Process Mapping
For the next stage of the workshop focused on eight core
identity moments that captured at a high level the typical
experiences of a doctor throughout their career. Participants
were asked a create process maps identifying key organisations
involved in each of these stages and the identity information
that a doctor is required to present to them. Additionally
participants were asked to capture frustrations that a doctor
might experience while navigating these identity moments.
The general identity moments identified and validated prior
to the workshop to provide some structure were as follows:
• Doctor graduating from university.
• Doctor applying for a job.
• Doctor joining a hospital.
• Doctor training.
• Doctor rotation.
• Doctor begins RCPE accreditation.
• Doctor qualifies as a Physician.
• Doctor moves abroad.
The workshop participants were split into groups, each
group focused on four of the identity moments. The results
were then presented back to the group providing a detailed
overview of each of the stages in a doctor’s career, including
recurring and trusted ecosystem entities such as the GMC
(General Medical Council). These maps were combined and
synthesised into a Gantt chart, showing the time burden and
repetition associated with a healthcare professionals as they
progress through their career, see Figure 2. This was developed
through follow up communication with a final year trainee at
the RCPE who attended the workshop.
B. Re-imagining Identity Moments using SSI
The next stage of the workshop involved an interactive
session on Self-Sovereign identity and the capabilities it could
provide healthcare professionals when applied to the key
identity moments that participants previously mapped out. The
goal was to give attendees a high level understanding of how
this technology works and where it might fit into existing
processes within healthcare.
Physical props were used to represent different aspects
of the SSI system and a number of workshop attendees
were asked to play roles within the healthcare ecosystem.
Specifically, six participants acted as the key entities and trust
providers identified in the process mapping stages:
• A Medical School - Before becoming a licensed doctor,
individuals must first complete a degree at a medical
school.
• The General Medical Council - The doctor licensing
body in the UK
• The Royal College of Edinburgh - Royal colleges are
involved with training and examination procedures for
junior doctors as they gradually specialise in a medical
discipline.
• Edinburgh Hospital - This hospital was used as the
initial place of employment once the fictional doctor in
our scenario graduated.
• Glasgow Hospital - This entity represented the doctor
rotation process within the scenario modelled.
• Health Education Scotland - A body involved with
continuous training and education of doctors.
The initial setup of the SSI healthcare ecosystem was
represented by asking each actor in the scenario to generate
a pubic/private key pair. A red (private) and green (public)
card was used to show the two halves of a public/private
key pair. Actors then attached their public key to a white
card, which was used to represent a decentralised identifier
(DID). All actors were asked to place their DID onto the wall,
representing the act of registering a public DID on a distributed
ledger such that the public keys for these trusted entities could
be resolved by anyone.
After the initial setup, a member of the research team played
the role of doctor and walked through each of the identity mo-
ments discussed and mapped in the process mapping session.
This interactive approach was used for a couple of purposes:
• To educate workshop attendees about the capabilities that
a Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) architecture enables.
• To illustrate how SSI could be applied to the healthcare
domain to streamline identity interactions.
Throughout this interactive session, a flipchart was used
to represent the doctors digital wallet. The wallet gradually
collected Verifiable Credentials represented as large post-it
notes and digital relationships, formed through peer DID
connections, were represented as small blue post-its within
the wallet. See Figure 3.
Within a SSI system there are generally four core interac-
tions;
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Cameron [28] Allen [30] Ferdous et al [33] De Waag [37] Toth Anderson Priddy [36]
Existence Existence
User Control and Consent Control and Consent Consent Control Control and consent
Access Access Access Access
Transparency Transparency Transparency
Pluralism of operators and
technologies
Portability Portability portability
Consistent experience
across contexts
Interoperability Interoperability Interoperability
Persistence Persistence Persistence
Minimal disclosure for a
constrained use
Minimalization Minimalization Data-minimalization
Protection Protection Security secure transactions and iden-
tity transfer
Autonomy Autonomy
Justifiable parties Choosability
Human integration Ease of use usability
Disclosure
Ownership
Directed identity Single source
Standard
Cost
Availability
Trust
Privacy
Integrity
Decentralization
Inclusivity
Reliability
Counterfeit prevention
Identity verification
Disclosure
Identity assurance
TABLE I
LIST OF DESIGN PRINCIPLES
• Establishing a peer DID connection to initiate a digital
relationship.
• Credential issuance.
• Proof request.
• Presentation of credential attributes in response to a proof
request.
Each of these interactions were represented in this scenario
as follows:
1) Establishing a peer DID connection: For this interac-
tion, the action used was simply a handshake between the
doctor and the party the doctor wished to connect with. For
example, during the doctor qualifies from medical school
process mapping the doctor had to establish a connection with
the GMC. Whilst the handshake took place participants were
explained that this represented forming a private peer-to-peer
communication channel across which message integrity and
authenticated origin can be verified. It was illustrated that the
connection was stored and managed by the digital wallet using
a small blue post-it note.
The fact that these connections could be formed either
face to face, or through a website was additionally discussed.
Explaining that you probably have more trust in a connection
formed face to face and that trust can be built across these
connections by sharing verifiable information.
This relationship once formed can last indefinitely, until one
individual or the other decides to break it off. This means that
the GMC or any entity could form more personal relationships
with the doctors they licence, enabling them to push them
relevant communication across their secure communication
channel.
2) Credential Issuance: Credential issuance was a recurring
SSI interaction that was represented in the scenario. The
medical school issued the doctor their medical degree, the
GMC issued their licence and the RCPE issued the doctors a
qualified physician credential. All these credentials exist in the
current system. They are attestations about the attributes and
qualifications of a doctor, made by entities with the authority to
make such claims. Before any credential issuance interaction,
a secure connection must have been formed as discussed above
this was highlighted through a handshake action.
Then workshop participants acting as the different trusted
entities within the scenario were asked the write the name of
the credential (a large post-it) and sign the credential using
their private key - the red card they received as part of the
setup. In reality they used a wet signature to represent this.
This helped convey the concept that once a credential has been
signed it is impossible to change the contents of that credential
without invalidating the signature - providing integrity to the
credential.
For simplicity the scenario did not represent individual
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Design Principle Definition
Existence The identity of a person exists independent of identity administrators or providers.
Control The person is in control of their digital identity and is able to choose what
personal data to share.
Autonomy A user is independent on creating identities, as many as required, without relying on
any party and be able to update/remove it.
Disclosure A user must have the ability to selectively disclose particular attributes.
Ownership The user is the ultimate owner of an identity, including the claims.
Consent Data must be released only after the user has consented to do so.
Access The person has full access to their own data.
Single source A user is the single source of truth regarding the identity.
Transparency Systems and algorithms are transparent and anyone should be able to examine how they
work.
Standard An identity must be based on open standards.
Cost Costs must be kept to minimum.
Portability Information and services about identity must be transportable to other services.
Interoperability Digital identities are continually available and as widely usable as possible.
Persistence An identity must be persistent as long as required by its owner.
Minimalization When data is disclosed, that disclosure should involve the minimum amount of data
necessary to accomplish the task at hand. For example, if only a minimum age is called
for, then the exact age should not be disclosed, and if only an age is requested, then
the more precise date of birth should not be disclosed.
Protection The rights of users must be protected. When there is a conflict between the needs of
the identity network and the rights of individual users, then the network should err on
the side of preserving the freedoms and rights of the individuals over the needs of the
network.
Availability An identity must be available and accessible from different platforms when required by
its owner.
Human welfare The identity system must contribute to human well-being.
Non-maleficence The system will not cause harm to others.
Justice Systematic unfairness (false negatives/positives) is avoided.
Trustworthiness Expectations to act with good will towards others.
Privacy The user has the right to decide what data is shared and to set boundaries.
Dignity Dignity is intertwined with emotional identity. Technological solutions have a respon-
sibility to uphold human dignity.
Solidarity Respectful cooperation between stakeholders.
Environmental welfare The solution should cause no environmental harm.
TABLE II
THE LIST OF DESIGN PRINCIPLES WAS VALIDATED IN A WORKSHOP
attributes that credentials contained - for example a GMC
credential might contain the doctors name and their GMC
licence number. This was conveyed verbally instead.
During the session, the signature type - CL signatures, and
the way that they work in the context of Verifiable Credentials
was briefly touched upon. Due to the importance to understand
why a doctor couldn’t easily share a credential. Specifically the
doctor contributes some secret information in a blind manner
into the signing protocol as one of the credential attributes.
Such that when the credential is signed and given to the doctor,
only they can prove they know the secret value that was signed
by the issuer. Even the issuer does not know this.
The wall of trusted DIDs and their corresponding public
keys was used to discuss how the doctor, or rather their
wallet, could verify the signatures on any credentials they were
issued to ensure they were valid. The doctor is also capable of
refusing a credential or suggesting changes before accepting -
for example if the issuer had spelt their name wrong.
3) Proof Request: A proof request is an SSI interaction
whereby an entity, generally referred to as a verifier, requests
proof of certain identity information from a holder - in this
scenario the doctor. The verifier is able to additionally specify
the credential schema that the identity information should
come from and the credential issuer if they wish.
For example, in the ecosystem modelled there were only
two hospitals - lets call them Glasgow Hospital and Edin-
burgh hospital for simplicity, Edinburgh may request proof
of a doctors name and DoB contained within an Identity
Verification credential and only accept this proof if it was
issued by Glasgow hospital (represented by it’s DID).
This was a complex interaction that was challenging to
represent within the scenario, so verbal communication was
used to outline the majority of it. The actor representing the
entity asking for a proof from the doctor, wrote this request
on a piece of card which was then passed to the doctor. It was
made clear that this communication went across an already
established DID connection and that proof requests could
include a subset of attributes from across multiple credentials.
4) Credential presentation: A credential presentation was
the final SSI interaction used repeatedly throughout the sce-
nario. This is the process by which a doctor, through the use
of their digital wallet, responds to a proof request by creating
a cryptographic presentation from one of more verifiable
credentials within their wallet.
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Fig. 2. Healthcare Professional’s identity moments
Within the scenario, this was illustrated by filling out a
card and creating a wet signature on this card. The card was
then passed to the entity/actor that requested the proof request.
Again, a lot of the complexity was conveyed verbally. It was
explained that a credential presentation is not the same as giv-
ing the credential within a digital wallet to the entity requesting
it. A presentation is a new and distinct cryptographic object,
that is created from one or more credentials, and can contain
any number of attributes from these credentials. This has both
privacy and security benefits.
Going back to the hospital example, Edinburgh may request
a doctor to prove their name, date of birth and GMC licence
number when initially employing a new doctor. This proof
request can be responded to in a single credential presentation
that combines the attributes from two separate credentials
originally issued by different entities into a new object that is
still cryptographically verifiable using the public keys of the
issuers. The keys that are publicly available and were stuck
on the wall during the initial setup.
C. Evaluating SSI design principles
The last session of the workshop, involved presenting SSI
in the context of traditional identity management systems such
as federated and user centric identity management systems.
Then asking for positive and negative aspects of the SSI
system presented to them. Challenges to it’s implementation
were also collected through this process.
After this, eight design principles and their definitions
selected from the literature were presented to the group.
Mentimeter, a tool for audience engagement, was used to
gauge how the participants valued these design principles. A
couple of additional questions were also asked.
Before we introduced the design principles from the liter-
ature to our audience, we asked them what they thought was
the most important feature of future technology that would
help them trust it. The list included the following:
• Use all over the ecosystem, all entities need to participate.
• Attention for end users, usability, convenience, workable.
• Buy-in from government and NHS.
• Future proof.
• Resilient, reliable, fraud resilient, protection, security.
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Fig. 3. A illustration of the workshop’s physical representation of an SSI ecosystem
• Control.
• Transparent data sharing, clear, clarity.
Comparing this list with the list of design principles that
we distilled from the literature demonstrates that our audience
adds two specific principles to the generic list. The first is
that they find it important to know that all entities will be
involved in the SSI ecosystem, including the government and
the NHS. The success of the system depends on buy-in of all
of the involved entities, and that is something that should be
developed from the start. Second is the attention for usability
and convenience. User engagement is important from the start
and throughout the development process.
We selected eight principles from the literature and ex-
plained the definitions to the participants. Then we asked them
to rank the principles in order of importance. The majority
selected protection as the most important, followed by control
& consent and interoperability. Then we asked to rank impor-
tance for each individual principle. Again, the highest scores
were for: protection; control and consent; and interoperability.
Figures 4 and 5 show the results of the Mentimeter polls. This
was used to get a sense of the room and the figures should be
interpreted with that in mind
Fig. 4. Principles ranked by importance
VI. WORKSHOP RESULTS
The workshop led to a number of key learning elements
about identity management for healthcare professionals. This
can be generally summarised as being complex, fragmented;
and time consuming in its current form. The process mapping
session led to an increased understanding of the identity
landscape within healthcare. We began the session with eight
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Fig. 5. Principles individually rated
identity moments that we framed as being chronological,
the idea behind this was to provide a rough skeleton for
participants to expand on in their process maps. It came to
light that we missed a key identity moment within a doctors
career, namely appraisal and re-validation. A process whereby
healthcare professionals must prove to relevant authorities that
they have gone through the relevant training to keep their skills
up to date such that they can still practice. This is a repetitive
process that occurs every three years. It was interesting to
find out that even the top level professionals in attendance
typically spent a couple of days every three years getting their
documents in order for this procedure.
Another point of clarification was that while we positioned
the 8 identity moments as chronological, a lot of them happen
in parallel. For example, a medical student typically gets
identity checked by the GMC prior to graduating, they also
spend their final year applying for jobs so that on graduation
they are ready to begin their career immediately. It was
pointed out that there is no strict temporal relationship between
the eight stages initially identified and a large part of the
frustrations come from the fact that the majority of these stages
are repeated over the course of a doctors career. Each time
requiring the same time consuming procedure.
A good example of this comes from what we broadly termed
doctor rotation, something commonly experienced within the
healthcare system. Especially for young doctors who can rotate
to a new location and role as often as every four months. While
this is reduces significantly as doctors progress in their career,
it still a common occurrence. Every time a doctor moves to a
new hospital there are a number of tasks that the doctor needs
to complete in order to on-board into the institution:
• They must complete a full identity verification check to
the NHS standards.
• They must provide evidence supporting all the claims
they made in their application. This is typically verified
by a consultant and their were estimates it takes up to a
full day of their time.
• They must complete an induction session, taking between
one and two days. This induction is required for both new
locations (e.g. hospitals) and new trusts and generally
includes repeated content due to lack of standardisation
across locations and trusts.
• They must organise an appointment with occupational
health, to prove they have up to date vaccinations. If
they don’t or are unable to prove they do then doctors
must have their vaccinations refreshed. Often leading to
needless re-vaccinations.
•
Another big bugbear of the group, particularly from atten-
dees still going through training, was keeping track of all
the training events they had attended. Including the need to
enter this information into multiple distinct silos. This was
further exacerbated by frustrating user experiences, different
document format requirements and even reviewers specifically
asking for physical copies due to the added burden that review-
ing digitally uploaded documents entailed. A clear example
of how digital tools have failed healthcare professionals by
increasing rather than reducing the burden placed on them to
manage their professional careers.
To summarise, the process mapping and ensuing discussions
highlighted numerous frustrations experienced by healthcare
professionals just to meet the requirements for managing their
career. A phrase that came up was the need to professionalise
the digital experience throughout a doctors career.
The method for conveying the capabilities of SSI and how
these might change the identity moments a doctor experiences
throughout their career was a success. The majority of partic-
ipants were engaged and achieved a good level of understand-
ing as shown through the questions that this generated. Many
of the participants indicated that they would be receptive to
these changes being implemented, in particular a trainee at the
RCPE was very supportive.
The workshops additionally surfaced a number of challenges
that attendees thought would need be to overcome in order to
roll this out within a healthcare system. Many participants
were senior professionals within healthcare, so had experi-
ences of other attempts to digitise aspects of healthcare. The
three core challenges identified were:
• Funding and business model: Who is paying for these
tools and what is in it for them. There is no clear path
to monetisation of the system, however for this to work
it needs to be well funded in order to produce something
that can scale. It was suggested that part of doctors annual
fees and membership to organisations like the GMC and
the Royal Colleges could be allocated towards a system
like this.
• Adoption: An SSI system works only when it achieves
large scale adoption. In order for this to happen it needs
to be led on a national level and show the benefit to
the entire ecosystem. It was also pointed out that while
benefit to doctors is relatively easy to show it needs to
be able to show benefit to the individual trusted entities.
They need to be the ones advocating for this system not
the doctors. All stakeholders must be clear on why this
shift is happening and what the benefit is too them.
• Overreaching: This technology is new and relatively
untested at scale. An interesting point was made that it
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is important to take small steps to prove its value and
build human trust before expanding the scope. Attempting
anything too large too quickly and failing could be dis-
astrous for the trust placed in the system and underlying
technology.
VII. CONCLUSION
To conclude, participants were largely in favour of the
technology described in the workshop. At least from the
viewpoint of it’s worth exploring further. A number of them
were keen to be involved in further iterations, offering support
finding additional doctors and medical students to further
explore the requirements of any technical solution from their
perspective. This research as further reinforced the importance
of developing user driven systems, ensuring that any solution
that does get rolled out is meeting the actual needs of
those it is designed for. The research identified overlooked
design principles, but also showed that the design principles
commonly referred to within the academic literature, when
explained, were also considered important by the system users
within a healthcare context.
Next steps include developing a proof of concept which can
then be validated with real users, this will include validating it
against the properties deemed important by participants: Us-
ability and Security. Additionally, A medical students identity
interactions in themselves seem complex, it would be valuable
to run another workshop specifically focusing on this area.
This should provide a different perspective from that gained
throughout this workshop.
The professionalisation of the digital experience within a
doctors career is long overdue. The COVID-19 crisis has
highlighted just how important these solutions can be for the
any health service. Staffing needs fluctuate widely across the
country, as different regions and hospitals hit their peaks of
this crisis at different times. The ability to redeploy doctors
to highly stressed areas within the service in minutes rather
that days - See figure 2. While a portion of these induction
processes can perhaps be ignored, trusts still have to meet
strict legal requirements around identity verification [2] - this
all takes time which could be spent saving lives. In addition to
the staffing flexibility an SSI based solution could bring, it also
has huge potential to cut costs and increase efficiency. A report
from the McKinsey Global Institute estimate that institutions
requiring high assurance identification for on-boarding could
see a 90 percent reduction in costs [40]. The World Economic
forum estimates savings of up to $205 Billion from seamless
and secure sharing of medical information between healthcare
organisations [41].
This seems to be the opportune moment to develop and
deploy an SSI solution. However, it is imperative that any
solution that is developed, especially if rushed through during
a crisis, is clear about what it wants to achieve for who.
Furthermore, these solutions should identify a process by
which to validate how well they are meeting the predefined
aims and requirements of those who are actually going to be
using it - healthcare professionals.
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